The Capacity of Private Information Retrieval with Private Side
  Information Under Storage Constraints by Wei, Yi-Peng & Ulukus, Sennur
ar
X
iv
:1
80
6.
01
25
3v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  4
 Ju
n 2
01
8
The Capacity of Private Information Retrieval with
Private Side Information Under Storage Constraints∗
Yi-Peng Wei Sennur Ulukus
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742
ypwei@umd.edu ulukus@umd.edu
June 5, 2018
Abstract
We consider the problem of private information retrieval (PIR) of a single message
out of K messages from N replicated and non-colluding databases where a cache-
enabled user (retriever) of cache-size S possesses side information in the form of un-
coded portions of the messages that are unknown to the databases. The identities of
these side information messages need to be kept private from the databases, i.e., we
consider PIR with private side information (PSI). We characterize the optimal nor-
malized download cost for this PIR-PSI problem under the storage constraint S as
D∗ = 1+ 1
N
+ 1
N2
+ · · ·+ 1
NK−1−M
+ 1−rM
NK−M
+
1−rM−1
NK−M+1
+ · · ·+ 1−r1
NK−1
, where ri is the por-
tion of the ith side information message that is cached with
∑M
i=1 ri = S. Based on this
capacity result, we prove two facts: First, for a fixed memory size S and a fixed number
of accessible messages M , uniform caching achieves the lowest normalized download
cost, i.e., ri =
S
M
, for i = 1, . . . ,M , is optimum. Second, for a fixed memory size S,
among all possible K − ⌈S⌉+ 1 uniform caching schemes, the uniform caching scheme
which caches M = K messages achieves the lowest normalized download cost.
1 Introduction
We consider the private information retrieval (PIR) problem with private side information
(PSI) for a cache-enabled user (retriever) under a cache storage size constraint. PIR refers to
the problem where a user wishes to download a desired message from distributed replicated
databases while keeping the identity of the desired message private against the databases.
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CNS 13-14733, CCF 14-22111, CNS 15-26608 and CCF 17-
13977.
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PSI refers to the setting where the user (retriever) possesses cached messages in its local
storage, which it wants to utilize to decrease the download cost during PIR, but at the
same time, keep their identities private against the databases. The goal of the PIR-PSI
problem is to devise the most efficient retrieval scheme under the joint desired message and
side information privacy constraints. The efficiency of a PIR-PSI scheme is measured by the
normalized download cost which is the ratio of the number of total downloaded bits to the
number of desired bits. In this work, we consider the PIR-PSI problem under a storage size
constraint at the user, and investigate how best the fixed-size user cache can be utilized.
We introduce the PIR-PSI problem under a storage constraint using the example shown
in Fig. 1. Consider a user wanting to download a message from N = 3 non-communicating
databases, each storing the same set of K = 5 messages. Assume that the user is already
in possession of M = 3 messages through some unspecified means; the user may have ob-
tained these from another user, or it may have prefetched them from another database. The
databases do not know the identities of these messages, but they know that the user has
access to M = 3 messages. (For this example, say these messages are W2, W4 and W5.)
However, the user has limited local storage with size S = 1 message. What should the user
keep in order to minimize the download cost of the desired message during the PIR phase
while keeping the identities of both desired and cached messages private? Should the user
keep 1 full message in its cache and discard the other 2 messages, shown as caching option 1
in Fig. 1? Should the user choose 2 messages, store half of each chosen message and discard
the remaining 1 message, shown as caching option 2 in Fig. 1? Or, should the user keep all
3 messages and store a portion of each? In that case, what portions of messages should the
user store? E.g., should it store 25% of W2, 25% of W4 and 50% of W5, shown as caching
option 3, or should it store 1
3
of all 3 messages, shown as caching option 4 in Fig. 1?
Different caching schemes result in different download costs for the PIR-PSI problem.
Intuition may say that if portions of many messages are kept in the cache, then the user will
need to protect many identities from the databases due to the PSI requirement, which may
seem disadvantageous. On the other hand, intuition may also say that keeping portions of
many messages may improve the diversity of side information for the PIR phase, which may
seem advantageous. What is the optimum way to utilize the user’s limited cache memory?
In this work, we characterize the optimal normalized download cost for any given caching
strategy, and determine the optimal caching strategy under a given storage constraint.
Related Work: The PIR problem has originated in the computer science community
[1–5] and has drawn attention in the information theory society [6–11] in recent years. In
the classical setting of PIR, there are N non-communicating databases, each storing the
same set of K messages. The user wishes to download one of these K messages without
letting the databases know the identity of the desired message. Sun and Jafar [12] have
characterized the optimal normalized download cost for the classical PIR problem to be
D
L
=
(
1 + 1
N
+ · · ·+ 1
NK−1
)
, where L is the message size and D is the total number of
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Figure 1: PIR-PSI under a storage constraint. Here N = 3, K = 5, S = 1, and M = 3.
downloaded bits from the N databases. After [12], many interesting variants of the classical
PIR problem have been investigated in [13–45]. The most closely related branch of PIR to
our setting in this paper is cache-aided PIR in [26, 30–33, 36, 39].
Cache-aided PIR is first considered in [26], where the user has a local cache of storage S
messages (SL bits) which can store any function of the K messages, and the cache content
of the user is perfectly known to all the N databases. The optimal normalized download cost
for this case is D∗(S) = (1− S
K
)
(
1 + 1
N
+ · · ·+ 1
NK−1
)
, which indicates that the user should
download the uncached part of the content via the optimum PIR scheme in [12]. The result
is somewhat pessimistic since the user cannot further reduce the download cost by using the
cache content. This has motivated subsequent works which have considered the case where
the databases are completely unaware or partially unaware of the cache content [30–33,36,39].
Within this sub-branch of literature, references [30, 32, 33] have considered PIR with PSI.
In [30], the authors considered the case where the user randomly choosesM full messages
out of K messages to cache, and none of the databases is aware of the identities of the M
chosen messages. The user wishes to keep the identities of the M chosen messages and
the desired message private, which is coined as PIR with PSI. For the case of a single
database, the optimal normalized download cost is settled in [30]. For general number
of databases, the optimal normalized download cost is characterized in [32] as D∗(M) =(
1 + 1
N
+ · · ·+ 1
NK−1−M
)
. In [33], a more practical scenario is considered where each database
is aware of the identities of the messages cached from that database only and unaware of
the remaining identities of messages cached from other databases, which is coined as PIR
with partially known PSI. Interestingly, the optimal normalized download cost for PIR with
partially known PSI is the same as the optimal normalized download cost for PIR with PSI.
Coming back to our paper, in this work, we consider PIR-PSI under a storage constraint.
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In the prefetching phase, the user can access M messages, and has a local cache storage of S
messages (SL symbols), where S ≤ M . For each of these M messages, the user caches the
first Lri symbols out of the total L symbols for i = 1, . . . ,M . The caching scheme is subject
to a memory size constraint, i.e.,
∑M
i=1 ri = S. Note that in [31, 36, 39], for each message,
the user randomly chooses Lr symbols out of the total L symbols to cache. In [31, 36, 39],
to reliably reconstruct the desired message, the user should record the indices of the cached
symbols within each message. In contrast, here, we consider the case where the user caches
the first Lri symbols of each message instead of random Lri symbols; this saves the user
extra storage overhead. The databases are aware of the caching scheme, but do not know the
identities of the cached messages, i.e., the databases know M and ri for i = 1, . . . ,M , but
do not know the identities of the cached messages. In the retrieval phase, the user wishes to
jointly keep the identities of the cached messages and the desired message private. We call
this model as PIR-PSI under a storage constraint.
For any given caching scheme, i.e., for given M and (r1, r2, . . . , rM), we characterize the
optimal normalized download cost to be D∗ = 1+ 1
N
+ 1
N2
+ · · ·+ 1
NK−1−M
+ 1−rM
NK−M
+ 1−rM−1
NK−M+1
+
· · · + 1−r1
NK−1
, where without loss of generality r1 ≥ r2 ≥ · · · ≥ rM . Based on this capacity
result, we prove two important facts: First, for a fixed memory size S and fixed number of
accessible messagesM , uniform caching achieves the lowest normalized download cost, where
uniform caching means ri =
S
M
, for i = 1, . . . ,M . Second, for a fixed memory size S, among
all the K − ⌈S⌉ + 1 uniform caching schemes, the uniform caching scheme which caches K
messages achieves the lowest normalized download cost. That is, in order to optimally utilize
the limited user cache memory, if the user has access to M files, it should keep SL/M bits
(equal amounts) from each message in its cache memory; and second, if possible, the user
should aim to have access to all K messages, i.e., M = K yields the lowest download cost.
2 System Model
We consider a system consisting of N non-communicating databases and a user (retriever).
Each database stores the same set ofK independent messagesW1, . . . ,WK , and each message
is of size L symbols, i.e.,
H(W1) = · · · = H(WK) = L, H(W1, . . . ,WK) = H(W1) + · · ·+H(WK). (1)
The user has a local cache memory which is of size SL symbols, where S ∈ [0, K]. There
are two phases in the system: the prefetching phase and the retrieval phase.
In the prefetching phase, the user can randomly access M messages out of total K
messages, where M ≥ S. For each of the M accessed messages, the user caches the first Lri
symbols out of the total L symbols for i = 1, . . . ,M . The caching scheme is subject to a
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memory size constraint of S, i.e.,
M∑
i=1
ri = S. (2)
We denote the indices (identities) of the cached M messages as H, and denote WH as the
cached messages. Therefore, |H| =M , and H(WH) = SL.
Note that M and (r1, . . . , rM) specify a caching scheme. If r1 = · · · = rM , we call this
a uniform caching scheme. For fixed S, there are K − ⌈S⌉ + 1 uniform caching schemes
depending on the number of accessible messages since M ≥ S. For instance, if there are
K = 3 messages in the databases and S = 1.5, then since M ≥ S, M can take one of two
possible values: either 2 or 3. Thus, there are two uniform caching schemes depending on
the value of M . Note, K − ⌈S⌉ + 1 = 3− ⌈1.5⌉+ 1 = 2.
We assume that all the databases are aware of the caching scheme but are unaware of
which messages are cached. For example, if S = 2, M = 3, and we say that the user has
applied a uniform caching scheme, the databases know that the user has chosen 3 messages
out of the total K messages to cache, and for each chosen message, the user has cached the
first 2
3
L symbols out of the total L symbols. However, the databases do not know which
messages are cached by the user.
In the retrieval phase, the user privately generates an index θ ∈ [K] = {1, . . . , K},
and wishes to retrieve message Wθ such that it is impossible for any individual database
to identify θ. At the same time, the user also wishes to keep the indices of the M cached
messages private, i.e., in the retrieval phase the databases cannot learn which messages are
cached. For random variables θ, H, and W1, . . . ,WK , we have
H (θ,H,W1, . . . ,WK) = H (θ) +H (H) +H(W1) + · · ·+H(WK). (3)
In order to retrieve message Wθ, the user sends N queries Q
[θ,H]
1 , . . . , Q
[θ,H]
N to the N
databases, where Q
[θ,H]
n is the query sent to the nth database for message Wθ. Note that
the queries are generated according to H, which are independent of the realization of the K
messages. Therefore,
I(W1, . . . ,WK ;Q
[θ,H]
1 , . . . , Q
[θ,H]
N ) = 0. (4)
Upon receiving the query Q
[θ,H]
n , the nth database replies with an answering string A
[θ,H]
n ,
which is a function of Q
[θ,H]
n and all the K messages. Therefore, ∀θ ∈ [K], ∀n ∈ [N ],
H(A[θ,H]n |Q
[θ,H]
n ,W1, . . . ,WK) = 0. (5)
After receiving the answering strings A
[θ,H]
1 , . . . , A
[θ,H]
N from all the N databases, the user
needs to decode the desired message Wθ reliably. By using Fano’s inequality, we have the
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following reliability constraint
H
(
Wθ|WH,H, Q
[θ,H]
1 , . . . , Q
[θ,H]
N , A
[θ,H]
1 , . . . , A
[θ,H]
N
)
= o(L), (6)
where o(L) denotes a function such that o(L)
L
→ 0 as L→∞.
To ensure that individual databases do not know which message is retrieved and to
keep the M cached messages private, we have the following privacy constraint, ∀n ∈ [N ],
∀θ, θ′ ∈ [K], ∀H,H′ ⊂ [K] such that |H| = |H′| =M ,
(Q[θ,H]n , A
[θ,H]
n ,W1, . . . ,WK) ∼ (Q
[θ′,H′]
n , A
[θ′,H′]
n ,W1, . . . ,WK), (7)
where A ∼ B means that A and B are identically distributed.
For a fixed N , K, S and caching scheme (r1, . . . , rM), a pair (D,L) is achievable if there
exists a PIR scheme for the message which is of size L symbols satisfying the reliability
constraint (6) and the privacy constraint (7), where D represents the expected number of
downloaded bits (over all the queries) from the N databases via the answering strings A
[θ,H]
1:N ,
where A
[θ,H]
1:N = (A
[θ,H]
1 , . . . , A
[θ,H]
N ), i.e.,
D =
N∑
n=1
H
(
A[θ,H]n
)
. (8)
In this work, we aim at characterizing the optimal normalized download cost D∗, where
D∗ = inf
{
D
L
: (D,L) is achievable
}
. (9)
3 Main Results and Discussions
We characterize the exact normalized download cost for PIR-PSI under a storage constraint
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 In PIR-PSI under a storage constraint, the optimal normalized download cost
is
D∗ = 1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1−M
+
1− rM
NK−M
+
1− rM−1
NK−M+1
+ · · ·+
1− r1
NK−1
(10)
where r1 ≥ r2 ≥ · · · ≥ rM without loss of generality.
The converse proof for Theorem 1 is given in Section 4, and the achievability proof for
Theorem 1 is given in Section 5.
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Remark 1 For S = 0, by letting ri = 0, for i = 1, . . . ,M , (10) reduces to
D∗ = 1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
, (11)
which is the optimal normalized download cost of the original PIR problem as shown in [12].
Remark 2 For S ∈ [K] and M = S, by letting ri = 1 for i = 1, . . . ,M , (10) reduces to
D∗ = 1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1−M
, (12)
which is the optimal normalized download cost of the PIR with PSI problem as shown in [32].
We can further generalize the result to the PIR with partially known PSI as shown in [33].
Note further that for M > S, ( 1−rM
NK−M
+ 1−rM−1
NK−M+1
+ · · ·+ 1−r1
NK−1
) is the penalty to the download
cost under the storage constraint.
Corollary 1 For fixed M ≥ S, uniform caching scheme achieves the lowest normalized
download cost.
Proof: The user has access to M messages. To achieve a low normalized download cost in
(10), we need to solve the following optimization problem,
min
αi,i=1,...,M
αM
1
NK−M
+ αM−1
1
NK−M+1
+ · · ·+ α1
1
NK−1
s.t. αM + αM−1 + · · ·+ α1 =M − S,
1 ≥ αM ≥ αM−1 ≥ · · · ≥ α1 ≥ 0, (13)
which is obtained by replacing 1−ri in (10) with αi for i = 1, . . . ,M . We prove by contradic-
tion that the minimum is achieved when αM = αM−1. Suppose not, then we have optimum
α∗M > α
∗
M−1. Choose δ =
α∗
M
−α∗
M−1
3
, and let α′M = α
∗
M −δ, α
′
M−1 = α
∗
M−1+δ. Then, with α
′
M
and α′M−1, we achieve a lower normalized download cost than with α
∗
M and α
∗
M−1, which gives
a contradiction. Therefore, we have αM = αM−1. Intuitively, note that the coefficient of αM
is larger than the coefficient of αM−1 in the objective function in (13). Therefore, in order
to minimize the objective function, we need to choose αM as small as possible. But, since
αM needs to be larger than αM−1 according to the constraint set of (13), the smallest αM we
can choose is αM = αM−1. Using similar arguments, we also have αM−1 = αM−2 = · · · = α1.
Therefore, uniform caching achieves the lowest normalized download cost for fixed M . 
Corollary 2 For fixed S, among all the K−⌈S⌉+1 uniform caching schemes, the uniform
caching scheme with M = K achieves the lowest normalized download cost.
Proof: For the uniform caching scheme M , the user caches the first S
M
L symbols of each
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chosen message. From (10), the normalized download cost is
D∗(M) = 1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1−M
+
(
1−
S
M
)(
1
NK−M
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)
. (14)
Considering the difference of the normalized download costs between D∗(M+1) and D∗(M),
D∗(M + 1)−D∗(M)
= 1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−2−M
+
(
1−
S
M + 1
)(
1
NK−M−1
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)
−
[
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1−M
+
(
1−
S
M
)(
1
NK−M
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)]
(15)
= −
S
M + 1
(
1
NK−M−1
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)
+
S
M
(
1
NK−M
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)
(16)
= −
S
M + 1
×
1
NK−M−1
+
(
S
M
−
S
M + 1
)(
1
NK−M
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)
(17)
=
S
M(M + 1)
(
1
NK−M
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)
−
S
M(M + 1)
×
M
NK−M−1
(18)
≤ 0. (19)
Thus, the uniform caching scheme with M = K achieves the lowest normalized download
cost among all possible uniform caching schemes. 
Corollary 3 For fixed S, among all possible caching schemes, the uniform caching scheme
with M = K achieves the lowest normalized download cost.
Proof: From Corollary 1, we know that for fixed M , uniform caching scheme achieves the
lowest normalized download cost. From Corollary 2, we know that among all uniform caching
schemes, the uniform caching scheme with M = K achieves the lowest normalized download
cost. Combining these two corollaries, we conclude that among all possible caching schemes,
the uniform caching scheme with M = K achieves the lowest normalized download cost. 
4 Converse Proof
In this section, we provide a lower bound for PIR-PSI under a storage constraint. In the fol-
lowing, without loss of generality, we relabel the messages according to H, such thatW1:M are
the messages accessed by the user in the prefetching phase, whereW1:M = (W1,W2, . . . ,WM).
Here, Wi denotes the message whose first Lri symbols are cached by the user, for i =
1, 2, . . . ,M , and without loss of generality, r1 ≥ r2 ≥ · · · ≥ rM .
We first need the following lemma, which develops a lower bound on the length of the
undesired portion of the answering strings as a consequence of the privacy constraint.
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Lemma 1 (Interference lower bound) For PIR-PSI under a storage constraint, the in-
terference from undesired messages within the answering strings, D − L, is lower bounded
by,
D − L+ o(L) ≥ I
(
W1:K−1;Q
[K,H]
1:N , A
[K,H]
1:N |WH,H,WK
)
. (20)
If the privacy constraint is absent, the user downloads only L symbols of the desired
message, however, when the privacy constraint is present, it should download D symbols.
The difference between D and L, i.e., D − L, corresponds to the undesired portion of the
answering strings. Note that Lemma 1 is an extension of [12, Lemma 5], where M = 0, i.e.,
the user has no PSI. Lemma 1 differs from its counterpart in [31, Lemma 1] in two aspects;
first, the left hand side isD(r)−L(1−r) in [31] as the user requests to download the uncached
bits only, and second, [31, Lemma 1] constructs K − 1 distinct lower bounds by changing k,
in contrast to only one bound here. In addition, we note that a similar argument to Lemma 1
can be implied from [32] and [33]. The main difference between Lemma 1 and [32,33] is that
WH refers to parts of messages here, while in [32, 33], WH refers to full messages.
Proof: We start with the right hand side of (20),
I
(
W1:K−1;Q
[K,H]
1:N , A
[K,H]
1:N |WH,H,WK
)
≤ I
(
W1:K−1;Q
[K,H]
1:N , A
[K,H]
1:N ,WK |WH,H
)
. (21)
For the right hand side of (21), we have
I
(
W1:K−1;Q
[K,H]
1:N , A
[K,H]
1:N ,WK |WH,H
)
= I
(
W1:K−1;Q
[K,H]
1:N , A
[K,H]
1:N |WH,H
)
+ I
(
W1:K−1;WK |Q
[K,H]
1:N , A
[K,H]
1:N ,WH,H
)
(22)
(6)
= I
(
W1:K−1;Q
[K,H]
1:N , A
[K,H]
1:N |WH,H
)
+ o(L) (23)
(3),(4)
= I
(
W1:K−1;A
[K,H]
1:N |WH,H, Q
[K,H]
1:N
)
+ o(L) (24)
= H
(
A
[K,H]
1:N |WH,H, Q
[K,H]
1:N
)
−H
(
A
[K,H]
1:N |WH,H, Q
[K,H]
1:N ,W1:K−1
)
+ o(L) (25)
≤ D −H
(
A
[K,H]
1:N |WH,H, Q
[K,H]
1:N ,W1:K−1
)
+ o(L) (26)
(6)
= D −H
(
A
[K,H]
1:N ,WK |WH,H, Q
[K,H]
1:N ,W1:K−1
)
+ o(L) (27)
≤ D −H
(
WK |WH,H, Q
[K,H]
1:N ,W1:K−1
)
+ o(L) (28)
(3),(4)
= D − L+ o(L) (29)
where (23), (27) follow from the decodability of WK given
(
Q
[K,H]
1:N , A
[K,H]
1:N ,WH,H
)
, (24),
(29) follow from the independence of W1:K and Q
[K,H]
1:N given H, and (26) follows from the
independence bound. Combining (21) and (29) yields (20). 
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For the conditional mutual information term on the right hand side of (20), we have
I
(
W1:K−1;Q
[K,H]
1:N , A
[K,H]
1:N |WH,H,WK
)
=
∑
h
p(h)I
(
W1:K−1;Q
[K,h]
1:N , A
[K,h]
1:N |Wh, h,WK
)
(30)
=
∑
h
p(h)I
(
W1:K−1;Q
[K,h]
1:N , A
[K,h]
1:N |Wh,WK
)
. (31)
where we have written the mutual information in (20) as an expectation over all possible
caching scheme realizations, as the databases do not know which messages are cached.
In the following lemma, we develop an inductive relation for the mutual information term
on the right hand side of (31).
Lemma 2 (Fractional induction lemma) For all k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}, the mutual infor-
mation term in (31) can be inductively lower bounded as,
I
(
W1:k;Q
[k+1,h]
1:N , A
[k+1,h]
1:N |Wh,Wk+1:K
)
≥
1
N
I
(
W1:k−1;Q
[k,h]
1:N , A
[k,h]
1:N |Wh,Wk:K
)
+
L
N
(1− rk)− o(L), (32)
where rk = 0 when k > M .
Lemma 2 is a generalization of [12, Lemma 6] to our setting. The main difference between
Lemma 2 and [12, Lemma 6] is that the cached PSI results in a different induction relation.
Proof: We start with the left hand side of (32),
I
(
W1:k;Q
[k+1,h]
1:N , A
[k+1,h]
1:N |Wh,Wk+1:K
)
=
1
N
×N × I
(
W1:k;Q
[k+1,h]
1:N , A
[k+1,h]
1:N |Wh,Wk+1:K
)
(33)
≥
1
N
N∑
n=1
I
(
W1:k;Q
[k+1,h]
n , A
[k+1,h]
n |Wh,Wk+1:K
)
(34)
(7)
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
I
(
W1:k;Q
[k,h]
n , A
[k,h]
n |Wh,Wk+1:K
)
(35)
≥
1
N
N∑
n=1
I
(
W1:k;A
[k,h]
n |Wh,Wk+1:K , Q
[k,h]
n
)
(36)
(5)
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
H
(
A[k,h]n |Wh,Wk+1:K , Q
[k,h]
n
)
(37)
≥
1
N
N∑
n=1
H
(
A[k,h]n |Wh,Wk+1:K , Q
[k,h]
1:N , A
[k,h]
1:n−1
)
(38)
(5)
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
I
(
W1:k;A
[k,h]
n |Wh,Wk+1:K, Q
[k,h]
1:N , A
[k,h]
1:n−1
)
(39)
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=
1
N
I
(
W1:k;A
[k,h]
1:N |Wh,Wk+1:K , Q
[k,h]
1:N
)
(40)
(3),(4)
=
1
N
I
(
W1:k;Q
[k,h]
1:N , A
[k,h]
1:N |Wh,Wk+1:K
)
(41)
(6)
=
1
N
I
(
W1:k;Wk, Q
[k,h]
1:N , A
[k,h]
1:N |Wh,Wk+1:K
)
− o(L) (42)
=
1
N
I (W1:k;Wk|Wh,Wk+1:K) +
1
N
I
(
W1:k;Q
[k,h]
1:N , A
[k,h]
1:N |Wh,Wk:K
)
− o(L) (43)
=
1
N
I
(
W1:k;Q
[k,h]
1:N , A
[k,h]
1:N |Wh,Wk:K
)
+
L
N
(1− rk)− o(L), (44)
where (34) and (36) follow from the chain rule and the non-negativity of mutual informa-
tion, (35) follows from the privacy constraint, (37), (39) follow from the fact that answer
strings are deterministic functions of the messages and the queries, (38) follows from the
fact that conditioning reduces entropy, (41) follows from the independence of W1:K and
Q
[k,h]
1:N , (42) follows from the reliability constraint on Wk, and (44) is due to the fact that
H (Wk|Wh,Wk+1:K) = L(1 − rk), where if k /∈ h then rk = 0. 
By applying Lemma 2 recursively to the right hand side of (31)
I
(
W1:K−1;Q
[K,h]
1:N , A
[K,h]
1:N |Wh,WK
)
(32)
≥
1
N
I
(
W1:K−2;Q
[K−1,h]
1:N , A
[K−1,h]
1:N |Wh,WK−1:K
)
+
L
N
− o(L) (45)
(32)
≥
1
N2
I
(
W1:K−3;Q
[K−2,h]
1:N , A
[K−2,h]
1:N |Wh,WK−2:K
)
+
L
N2
+
L
N
− o(L) (46)
(32)
≥ . . . (47)
(32)
≥
1
NK−1−M
I
(
W1:M ;Q
[M+1,h]
1:N , A
[M+1,h]
1:N |Wh,WM+1:K
)
+
L
NK−1−M
+ · · ·+
L
N2
+
L
N
− o(L) (48)
(32)
≥
1
NK−M
I
(
W1:M−1;Q
[M,h]
1:N , A
[M,h]
1:N |Wh,WM :K
)
+
L
NK−M
(1− rM)
+
L
NK−1−M
+ · · ·+
L
N2
+
L
N
− o(L) (49)
(32)
≥ . . . (50)
(32)
≥
L(1− r1)
NK−1
+ · · ·+
L(1 − rM)
NK−M
+ · · ·+
L
N2
+
L
N
− o(L). (51)
Note that in (45) to (48), we apply the fractional induction lemma with r = 0, since WM+1:K
are not cached in Wh. In (49) to (51), rk > 0 for the fractional induction lemma, since W1:M
are cached in Wh partially.
By combining (20), (31), and (51), and dividing by L on both sides, we obtain a lower
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bound for the normalized download cost as
D∗ ≥ 1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1−M
+
1− rM
NK−M
+
1− rM−1
NK−M+1
+ · · ·+
1− r1
NK−1
, (52)
which proves (10).
5 Achievability Proof
Our achievability scheme is based on the PIR schemes in [12] and [32]. For the portion
of the messages not cached by the user, we use the PIR scheme in [12], which applies the
following three principles recursively: 1) database symmetry, 2) message symmetry within
each database, and 3) exploiting undesired messages as side information. For the portion of
the messages cached by the user, we use the PIR scheme in [32], which is based on MDS
codes and consists of two stages: The first stage determines the systematic part of the MDS
code according to the queries generated in [12]. In the second stage, the user reduces the
download cost by downloading the parity part of the MDS code only. By applying the
two PIR schemes, the user retrieves the desired message privately while keeping the cached
messages private.
5.1 Motivating Examples
5.1.1 N = 2 Databases, K = 5 Messages, M = 2 Accessed Messages, and S = 1
with Uniform Caching
In this example, in the prefetching phase, the user randomly chooses two messages to cache,
say W1 and W4. Since S = 1 and the user uses uniform caching scheme, the user caches
the first half of W1 and the first half of W4. We note that the databases are aware of the
caching scheme, i.e., the databases know that two out of five messages are chosen by the
user, and the first halves of the chosen messages are cached. However, the databases do not
know which are the two chosen messages.
In the retrieval phase, assume that the user wishes to retrieve message W3 privately. For
the first half portion of the message, i.e., for the symbols in the interval [0, L
2
], since the user
has cached messages W1 and W4, the user applies the PIR scheme in [32] with M = 2. The
total download cost for the first half portion of the message, as shown in (12), is
L
2
×
(
1 +
1
2
+
1
25−1−2
)
. (53)
For the remaining half portion of the message, i.e., for the symbols in the interval [L
2
, L],
since the user has not cached any messages, the user applies the PIR scheme in [12]. The
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PIR in [12]
PIR in [32], M = 1
PIR in [32], M = 3
W1
W2
W3
W4
W5
W2
W4
W1
W3
W5
Figure 2: Achievable scheme: K = 5, S = 1, and M = 3 with r1 =
1
2
, and r2 = r3 =
1
4
.
total download cost for the remaining half portion of the message, as shown in (11), is
L
2
×
(
1 +
1
2
+
1
22
+
1
23
+
1
25−1
)
. (54)
The overall download cost is the sum of (53) and (54). Therefore, the optimal normalized
download cost is 59
32
, which can also be obtained through (10) by letting r1 =
1
2
and r2 =
1
2
.
Note that since we have applied the PIR scheme in [32] to retrieve the first half portion of
the message, the databases cannot learn which messages are cached by the user. In addition,
both PIR schemes in [12] and [32] keep the identity of the desired message private. Therefore,
the combination of these two PIR schemes is a feasible PIR scheme for PIR-PSI a under
storage constraint [16].
5.1.2 N = 2 Databases, K = 5 Messages, S = 1, M = 3 with r1 =
1
2
, and r2 = r3 =
1
4
In this example, see Fig. 2, in the prefetching phase, since r1 =
1
2
, the user first randomly
chooses one message to cache, say W3, and the user caches the first half of W3. Since
r2 = r3 =
1
4
, the user then randomly chooses two other messages to cache, say W2 and W5,
and the user caches the first 1
4
portions ofW2 andW5. Note that S = 1 and
1
2
×1+ 1
4
×2 = 1,
and the local cache memory size constraint is satisfied. We note that the databases are aware
of the caching strategy, i.e., the databases know that three out of five messages are chosen by
the user, and for one of the chosen message, the first half of the message is cached, and for
the remaining two chosen messages, the first 1
4
portions are cached. However, the databases
do not know which three messages are chosen.
In the retrieval phase, assume that the user wishes to retrieve message W1 privately. For
the first 1
4
portion of messages, i.e., for the symbols in the interval [0, L
4
], since the user caches
messages W2, W3 and W5, the user applies the PIR scheme in [32] with M = 3. The total
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download cost for the first 1
4
portion of the message, as shown in (12), is
L
4
×
(
1 +
1
25−1−3
)
. (55)
For the following 1
4
portion of messages, i.e., for the symbols in the interval [L
4
, L
2
], since the
user caches message W3, the user applies the PIR scheme in [32] with M = 1. The total
download cost for the second 1
4
portion of the message, as shown in (12), is
L
4
×
(
1 +
1
2
+
1
22
+
1
25−1−1
)
. (56)
For the last half portion of messages, i.e., for the symbols in the interval [L
2
, L], since the user
has not cached any messages, the user applies the PIR scheme in [12]. The total download
cost for the last half portion of the message, as shown in (11), is
L
2
×
(
1 +
1
2
+
1
22
+
1
23
+
1
25−1
)
. (57)
The overall download cost is the sum of (55), (56) and (57). Therefore, the optimal
normalized download cost is 29
16
, which can also be obtained through (10) by letting r1 =
1
2
,
and r2 = r3 =
1
4
. Note that by applying the PIR scheme in [32] to retrieve the first 1
4
portion
and the middle 1
4
portion of the message, the databases cannot learn which messages have
been cached by the user. In addition, both PIR schemes in [12] and [32] hide the identity of
the desired message. Therefore, the combination of these two PIR schemes is a feasible PIR
scheme for PIR-PSI under a storage constraint [16].
5.2 General Achievable Scheme
We now describe the general achievable scheme for r1 ≥ r2 ≥ · · · ≥ rM . We first consider the
first rM fraction of messages, i.e., for the symbols in the interval [0, LrM ]. Since r1 ≥ r2 ≥
· · · ≥ rM , the user caches M messages for this portion. The user applies the PIR scheme
in [32] which results in the download cost
LrM ×
(
1 +
1
N
++
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1−M
)
. (58)
Following the same logic, for the symbols in the interval [Lri, Lri−1], i ≥ 2, the user caches
i messages for this portion. The user applies the PIR scheme in [32] which results in the
download cost
L(ri−1 − ri)×
(
1 +
1
N
++
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−i
)
. (59)
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Lastly, for the symbols in the interval [Lr1, L], the user caches no messages for this portion.
The user applies the PIR scheme in [12] which results in the download cost
L(1 − r1)×
(
1 +
1
N
++
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)
. (60)
The overall download cost is the sum of (58), (59) for i = 2, 3, . . . ,M , and (60), which
is (10). By applying the PIR scheme in [32] to retrieve symbols in the interval of [0, Lr1],
the databases cannot learn which messages have been cached by the user. In addition, both
PIR schemes in [12] and [32] protect the identity of the desired message. Therefore, the
combination of these two PIR schemes is a feasible PIR scheme for PIR-PSI under a storage
constraint [16].
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a new PIR model, namely PIR-PSI under a storage
constraint. In this model, the user randomly chooses M messages and caches the first ri
portion of the chosen messages for i = 1, . . . ,M subject to the memory size constraint∑M
i=1 ri = S. In the retrieval phase, the user wishes to retrieve a message such that no
individual database can learn the identity of the desired message and the identities of the
cached messages. For each caching scheme, i.e., (r1, . . . , rM), we characterized the optimal
normalized download cost to beD∗ = 1+ 1
N
+ 1
N2
+· · ·+ 1
NK−1−M
+ 1−rM
NK−M
+ 1−rM−1
NK−M+1
+· · ·+ 1−r1
NK−1
.
In addition, we showed that, for a fixed memory size S, and a fixed number of accessible
messages M , uniform caching achieves the lowest normalized download cost, where uniform
caching means ri =
S
M
, i = 1, . . . ,M . Then, we showed that, for a fixed memory size
S, among all K − ⌈S⌉ + 1 uniform caching schemes, the uniform caching scheme caching
M = K messages achieves the lowest normalized download cost. Finally, we conclude that
for a fixed memory size S, the uniform caching scheme caching K messages achieves the
lowest normalized download cost.
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